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NOTES
Immunity Under the Speech or Debate Clause for
Republication and from Questioning About Sources
Gravel v. United States,1 which arose out of Senator Mike Gravel's
attempt to publicize the Pentagon Papers,2 concerned the scope of
the immunity conferred upon a legislator and his aide under article
I, section 6, of the United States Constitution.3 This provision, commonly called the "speech or debate clause," provides that "for any
Speech or Debate in either House, [United States Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." 4 Gravel is
one of the few Supreme Court interpretations of this clause.5
On June 29, 1971, the Senator called a late-night meeting of the
Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public
I. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
2. Formally entitled History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet
Nam Polic<>••
3. For law review treatments of the speech or debate immunity, see generally Ervin,
The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congress and Independence, 59 VA. L.
R.Ev. 175 (1973); Velvel, The Supreme Court Tramples Gravel, 61 KY. L.J. 525 (1973);
Comment, Brewster, Gravel and Legislative Immunity, 73 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 125 (1973);
Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV.LR.Ev. I, 189-201 (1972); Note, Blacklisting Through the Official Publication of Congressional Reports, 81 YALE L.J. 188
(1971); Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate:
Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK
L. R.Ev. I (1968); Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees,
77 YALE L.J. 366 (1967); Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity from Prosecution,
75 YALE L.J. 335 (1965); Comment, Absolute Privilege as Applied to Investigators for
Congressional Committees, 63 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 326 (1963); Oppenheim, Congressional
Free Speech, 8 LoYOLA L. R.Ev. 1 (1956); Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional
Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 960 (1951); Note, "They
Shall Not Be Questioned •• .": Congressional Privilege To Inflict Verbal Injury, 3
STAN. L. R.Ev. 486 (1951); Field, The Constitutional Privileges of Legislators: Exemption
from Arrest and Action for Defamation, 9 MINN. L. R.Ev. 442 (1925); Veeder, Absolute
Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, IO COLUM. L. R.Ev.
l3l (1910).
4. The clause has its origins in the attempts by the English Parliament to exercise
power over royal succession and religion. Cella, supra note 3, at 4-5. The first statutory
recognition of the immunity of members of Parliament for speeches made in Parliament was contained in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. As
in the case of many other English political principles, the immunity took root in
America in the eighteenth century. It was a matter of contention in the struggles
between the royal governors and the colonial assemblies and between the English
Parliament and the assemblies. Cella, supra, at 13-14. See also M. CLARKE, PARLIAMEN•
TARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 12 (1943). Consequently, the privilege was
explicitly recognized in the Articles of Confederation of 1777 and in several state
constitutions. Cella, supra, at 14. For further treatment of the privilege's history, see
C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921); E. l\fAY, THE
LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 42-66 (17th ed. 1964); Neale,
The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in TUDOR Snmrns 257 (R. SetonWatson ed. 1924).
5. For other recent decisions, see Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May
29, 1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
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Works Committee, read a summary of the high points of the Papers,
and then introduced all forty-seven volumes into the record. Two
weeks later, in an effort to publicize the Papers further, Gravel's
aide Leonard Rodberg began negotiations with various publishers,
one of whom agreed to publish them. 6 As a result of his activities,
Rodberg was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury investigating the
release and publication of the Papers.7 In moving to quash the subpoena, Rodberg argued that it violated his immunity under the
speech or debate clause. 8 Although Gravel was not himself subpoenaed, he obtained permission to intervene in the proceeding on
Rodberg's motion. He then moved to quash the subpoena and to
require the government to specify the questions it intended to ask
Rodberg. 9
The district court refused to quash the subpoena, but it did
issue a protective order prohibiting the government from asking
Rodberg about activities undertaken at the Senator's direction and
from asking any witness about Gravel's preparation for or conduct
at the subcommittee meeting. 10 It did not hold that private publication of the Papers would be privileged. The court of appeals affirmed,
with only slight modification, the decision of the district court. 11
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that Gravel was immune
from questioning about his actions at the subcommittee meeting12
and that Rodberg shared this immunity.13 However, taking a narrow
view of the speech or debate clause, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice White, held that private republication was not within its
protection and that both Gravel and Rodberg could be questioned
about the source of their information (that is, how they obtained
the Papers). 14 These last two holdings provoked considerable controversy on the Court and will be the focus of this Note.
6. For a detailed discussion of the case's factual background, see S. UNGAR, THE
THE PAPERS (1972).
7. The crimes in question were the retention of public properties or records with
intent to convert them to the use of another or to convey them to another, 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1970); the transmittal of national defense information, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1970);
the removal of public records, 18 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970); and conspiracy to commit such
offenses and to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970). United States v. Doe,
332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971).
8. Rodberg also argued that his first amendment rights were violated because
questioning by the grand jury would reduce his ability to gather the confidential
information necessary to his multiple roles as writer,.lecturer, and adviser to senators
and congressmen. The trial court summarily rejected this contention. United States
v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971).
9. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (D. Mass. 1971).
10. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 938 (D. Mass. 1971).
11. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1972).
12. 408 U.S. at 615-16.
13. 408 U.S. at 616-22.
14. 408 U.S. at 622-29.
PAPERS&:
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The rationale for the Court's decision on sources was simply
that the speech or debate clause does not immunize a senator or his
aide "from testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving
third-party crimes where the questions do not require testimony
about . . . a legislative act."rn ,vith respect to republication, the
Court again stressed that the scope of the speech or debate clause was
limited to legislative acts 16 and concluded that "private publication
by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in
no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate . . . ."17
Dissenting Justices Stewart,18 Douglas,19 and Brennan,20 who
was joined in his dissent by Marshall and Douglas, all argued that a
senator's sources should fall within the immunity conferred by the
clause in order to safeguard clearly legislative conduct like speechmaking and voting in Congress. First, it was contended that congressional sources of information would dry up if legislators could give
no assurance of anonymity. 21 Second, Justice Brennan felt that
preparatory activity should be covered because "[i]t would accomplish little toward the goal of legislative freedom to exempt an official act from intimidating scrutiny, if other conduct leading up to
the act and intimately related to it could be deterred by a similar
threat." 22 Stewart made a third argument: the majority's ruling
would allow the executive to threaten legislative independence, contrary to the basic purpose of the clause. A congressman could be
15. 408 U.S. at 622. The Court took a narrow view of "legislative acts," noting that
the fact that "Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as
Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature." 408 U.S. at 625.
In the Court's view, to receive the protection of the clause an act "must be an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in
committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." 408 U.S. at 625.
16. 408 U.S. at 624-25.
17. 408 U.S. at 625. The Court also relied on early English and American cases that,
it claimed, showed that republication outside the legislative body was not protected by
the speech or debate clause. See notes 125-38 infra and accompanying text.
The Court noted that republication might involve the journal of proceedings
clause of article I, section 5 (set out in note 88 infra), if authorized by the Senate
itself, but did not indicate how this would affect its decision. See 408 U.S. at 626 n.16.
Subsequently, in Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 29, 1973), the Court
held that the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer were not immune
from suit where the publication infringed on important personal rights even if the
publication was ordered by Congress. The Court focused on the speech or debate
clause and the possibility of official immunity, ignoring the journal of proceedings
clause.
18. 408 U.S. at 629-33.
19. 408 U.S. at 633-48.
20. 408 U.S. at 648-64.
21. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J.), quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 758-59
(1st Cir. 1972); 408 U.S. at 663 (Brennan, J.).
22. 408 U.S. at 663.
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subpoenaed by a vindictive executive to testify about information
whether or not the informants had in fact committed crimes or had
knowledge of crimes, since no limits have been imposed by the judiciary on the broad investigatory powers of a grand jury.23
Douglas and Brennan argued that republication should also be
protected, because it is essentially legislative conduct even though it
occurs outside the halls of Congress.24 The thrust of Brennan's and
Douglas' separate arguments was that the majority, in allowing the
grand jury to question Gravel and his aide about their dealings with
private publishers, excluded from immunity an activity, central to
the democratic system, that Woodrow Wilson called the "informing
function." 25 They emphasized that republication educated and informed the citizenry about the workings of the executive and the
federal government and fostered "public faith in the responsiveness of Govemment."26

I. A

FRAMEWORK FOR .ANALYSIS

Until Gravel it had not been definitely decided whether the immunity of the speech or debate clause covered activity preparatory
to conduct within Congress, such as gathering information for a
congressional speech, or subsequent activity outside the legislative
chambers, such as republication.27 The basic question cutting across
these issues was whether a broad or narrow view was to be taken of
the speech or debate clause. Coffin v. Coffin,28 the classic treatment of
the scope of legislative immunity for speech or debate although it involved a state constitutional provision stated that "the article ought
not to be construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it
may be answered." 29 Since Coffin, federal courts have framed the
scope of the clause in terms of whether the activity is "legislative"
or "nonlegislative." 30
Despite its wording, the clause has never been confined literally
23. 408 U.S. at 631-32.
24. 408 U.S. at 636-37 (Douglas, J.), 649 (Brennan, J.).
25. w. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303-04 (1885), quoted with approval
by Justice Douglas, 408 U.S. at 639, and Justice Brennan, 408 U.S. at 650-51. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957).
26. 408 U.S. at 651-52 (Brennan, J.). See also 408 U.S. at 639-41 (Douglas, J.).
27. Cella, supra note 3, at 36, expressed this uncertainty in 1968:
But even where the privilege doctrine is more narrowly phrased in terms of
speech and debate, innumerable practical difficulties in the application of the
doctrine can readily be foreseen. Does the privilege extend to all of the language
and actions of legislators serving on a legislative committee? . . . And what of a
legislator, not specifically authorized or directed by any vote of the legislature, who
conducts an inquiry of his own to acquire information to enable him to discharge
his legislative duties in a proper manner?
28. 4 Mass. 1 (1808). The case is discussed at length in Cella, supra note 3, at 18-30.
29. 4 Mass. at 27.
30. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514-16 (1972).
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to "Speech or Debate in either House." Instead, courts have taken
into account a variety of factors in delineating its limits. Foremost,
of course, are the purposes of the clause. Of these, the most often
mentioned is the facilitation of the performance of legislative tasks,31
a rationale similar to that given for the immunity afforded the officers and employees of the executive branch.32 The second purpose,
and the one most in keeping with the clause's historical origins, is
to safeguard the independence of the legislature as a branch of government coequal with the executive and judicial branches.33
The doctrine of legislative immunity is also related to the
broader legal problem of judicial respect for the separation of
powers.34 There is a historical judicial deference to the power of the
legislature to discipline its own members. 35 Justice Stewart, in his
dissent in Gravel, relied on this in arguing that Congress, not the
courts, should punish legislators for withholding information acquired during their information-gathering activities.36 Additionally,
the general rule against inquiry by other branches into legislative
motives37 was discerned by Justice Frankfurter to be part of the
rationale underlying the speech or debate clause.38
31. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969): "The purpose of the
protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review of legislative action but
to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of
their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions." See also
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
32. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1959).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1965) (Harlan, J.): "The
legislative privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive
and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of the 'practical security' for
insuring the independence of the legislature." James Wilson, one of the members of
the Committee on Detail that was responsible for inserting the clause into the Constitution, also recognized the relationship between the privilege and legislative independence: "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offence." THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
34. See Note, 77 YALE L.J. 366, supra note 3, at 385-86. See generally Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966).
35. To some extent, the association of the speech or debate clause with the separa-

tion-of-powers doctrine came about because of the special respect of the English
courts for Parliament's plenary power and judicial tradition. "It is by no means an
exaggeration to say that these judicial characteristics colored and influenced some of
the great struggles over privilege in and out of Parliament to the very close of the
nineteenth century. . . . Nowhere has the theory that Parliament is a court ... persisted longer than in the history of privilege of Parliament .•.." C. W1rrKE, supra
note 4, at 14.
36. 408 U.S. at 632.
37. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsr DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21 (1962).
38. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). However, it can be argued that
the reasons against judicial inquiry into legislative motive do not apply to inquiry
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Despite frequent statements that the clause should be construed
broadly to effect its purposes, countervailing interests have been recognized in historical limitations on the scope of the immunity.30
Legislators have always been prone to abuse the privilege of their
office; 40 unfortunately, the speech or debate clause has protected
some legislators from being punished for these abuses. The slanderous remarks made by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950's
constituted such flagrant abuse of the privilege that consideration was
given to amending the clause.41 The continuation of the immunity,
even for speech that the speaker knows to be false, is apparently
based on the theory, articulated by Judge Prettyman in Barsky v.
United States,42 that the "individual hurt" is overbalanced by "the
public necessity for untrammeled freedom of legislative . . . activity. "43 Nonetheless, when individual or public interests have been
harmed by the conduct of legislators outside of Congress, the courts
have readily enforced criminal and civil sanctions.44 In addition, the
rights of individuals have been vindicated in suits against the employees who implement policies of the legislators outside of Congress, even though the congressmen themselves could not be sued
for enacting the policies.45
The tendency of the judiciary to confine immunity to "things
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it" 46 may be more than an effort to
stay as close as possible to the language of "Speech and Debate."
Delineating the limits of the clause in this manner probably represents a compromise between divergent interests. In balancing these
interests the courts have given primary significance to voting and
speeches within the legislative chambers. Unfortunately, like the
courts before it, the Gravel court contented itself only with broad
statements about the clause. It neither detailed specifically the interests to be served by the clause, nor indicated precisely what weight
into an individual legislator's motives, potentially at issue in a case like Gravel. See,
e.g., Note, 75 YALE L.J. 335, supra note 3, at 340. See also text accompanying note 52
infra.
39. See Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 126-29.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955); Burton v. United
States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); May v. United States, 175 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United
States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 664 (C.C.D. Neb. 1904). Perhaps in recognition of this problem,
Congress has delegated the responsibility for crimes such as bribery to the courts for
the past one hundred years. See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 335, supra note 3, at 341.
41. See Yankwich, supra note 3, at 973-77.
42. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
43. 167 F.2d at 250.
44. See cases cited in note 40 supra.
45. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 20, 1973); Powell v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
46. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
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is to be given to these interests in relation to competing considerations. Furthermore, the Court failed to define clearly the proper role
of the judiciary in adjudicating conflicts between different branches
of the government and the place that the clause must necessarily have
in defining this role. 47
The thesis of this Note is that the Court's imprecision was more
than a missed opportunity to clarify the underlying rationale of the
limitations on immunity, for it led the Court to restrict the scope
of immunity unwisely in one important respect. The application of
the clause to Gravel's activities at the subcommittee meeting and to
his aide, to the extent Rodberg was engaged in legislative conduct,
were unexceptionable. Moreover, although the bases for the Court's
limitation could have been discussed more adequately, its refusal
to extend the immunity to private republication was not ill-founded,
either in terms of the competing interests at stake or in terms of the
historical scope of the clause. However, it appears that the majority
erred in refusing to apply the immunity to questioning about a legislator's sources.

II.

SHOULD LEGISLATORS AND THEIR AIDES BE IMMUNE
FROM QUESTIONING A.BOUT THEIR SOURCES?

The majority never made clear the basis for its ruling that congressmen are not immune from questioning about their sources of
information. This may have been due to the fact that the issue was
not raised in the petitions for certiorari or in the written briefs and
was only tangentially discussed at oral arguments. 48 In any case, the
majority's conclusion is not entirely inconsistent with the traditional
interpretation of the scope of the immunity. Despite Justice Brennan's argument to the contrary,49 the ruling is not inconsistent with
United States v. ]ohnson,w in which the Supreme Court held that a
47. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (prosecution of former senator
for solicitation and acceptance of bribes), probably represents the most complete
judicial discussion of the various factors relevant to determining the proper limits of
the speech or debate clause. In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that the
immunity afforded by the clause was not always a benign force and that it was often
subject to abuse. 408 U.S. at 517. But the Court reasoned that the immunity was not
applicable to Senator Brewster because no inquiry into legislative acts was "necessary
for the government to make out a prima facie case." 408 U.S. at 525. It also downplayed the threat of a substantial increase in the power of the executive and judicial
branches over the legislative because it felt that there was very little historical evidence of the existence of the threat and that certain elements of the American systemthe free press and the vigilance of the public-would not allow such a state of affairs.
408 U.S. at 523-24. Also, the Court expressed skepticism about the willingness and
ability of the legislative branch to punish its own members for misconduct occurring
outside Congress. 408 U.S. at 518-20.
48. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
49. 408 U.S. at 662-63.
50. 383 U.S. 169 (1966). This case is discussed in Cella, supra note 3, at 31-37.
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congressman who accepted a bribe to make a speech in the Congress
was immune from prosecution. According to Brennan, questioning
about sources should not be allowed in Gravel, just as the bribery
prosecution was not allowed in Johnson, because close scrutiny of
conduct leading up to legislative acts would effectively diminish
legislative freedom. 51 However, it could be argued that criminal acts
of third parties, which were involved in Gravel though not in Johnson, can be investigated by a grand jury without investigating the
legislative motives of the legislator. The Johnson Court did appear
to rest its decision on the impropriety of investigating legislative
motives, finding that the clause protects them from scrutiny. 52
Nevertheless, if it is assumed that the purposes of the speech or
debate clause are to preserve the balance of power between the three
branches of government and to encourage knowledgeable and effective legislative activity,53 two arguments made by the dissents in
Gravel deserve serious consideration. First, questioning legislators
about their sources of information may directly deter legislative
activity. To begin with, the possibility of a subsequent investigation
into a legislator's acquisition of information may deter the legislator
from using the information in a speech and thereby act as a constraint on his behavior. This would be especially likely if the legislator is unwilling to risk harm to his source. In addition, as Justice
Stewart pointed out, this deterrent effect is magnified by the potential for abuse by grand juries that has resulted from the relaxed rules
governing their investigations.54
Second, questioning legislators about their sources may make
sources unwilling to provide the information necessary for the efficient performance of legislative duties. This argument is analogous
to that rejected by the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 55 which held
that newsmen have no immunity from questioning about those of
their sources who are allegedly involved in criminal activities. In
both cases, those who sought immunity argued that it should attach
51.
52.
53.
54.

408 U.S. at 662-63.
383 U.S. at 177, 180-85.

See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
408 U.S. at 631-32. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). "In

recent years, •.• the federal grand jury has assumed a broad investigative role and
a corresponding potential for conduct which may result in embarrassment, infamy, and
reprisal to innocent individuals." Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 2
(1972).

This potential for abuse could be considerably reduced by allowing a legislator to
obtain a protective order limiting a grand jury's questioning when it can be shown
that the investigation is being conducted in bad faith or for the purpose of disrupting
the legislator's activities. The Court has suggested this remedy would be available to
a newsman if he were harassed by a grand jury. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 70708 (1972).
55. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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to constitutionally protected freedoms of expression,56 and, in both
cases, the argument assumed that the access to information necessary
to exercise those freedoms would not be available unless the immunity of the sources that supply information could be assured.
However, Branzburg should not be dispositive, for there is greater
justification for the immunity in the case of legislators than in the
case of newsmen. 57 Legislators tend to be more responsive to the
public interest because they are subject to the control of fellow legislators, through the rules of legislative bodies, and of the public,
through its use of the ballot.58 Selected by the people to be the
nation's leaders, they arguably have character attributes that make
them likely to use the information for productive ends.59 Furthermore, although it may be argued that availability of information to
all is important for the formation of public policies in a democracy,
it is particularly crucial that those who make the actual decisions
have access to all necessary information. 6° Finally, the fact that legislators, unlike newsmen, are specifically accorded immunity in the
text of the Constitution is of great weight; there is no problem of
justifying the granting of immunity to one special group, as there
was in Branzb urg. 61
Three questions must be addressed in order to evaluate the
above two arguments. First, is the type of information provided by
covert sources important? second, is there in fact a connection between the immunity and the availability of the needed information?
and, third, even if there is such a relationship, should the immunity
be denied because of stronger competing interests?
It appears that the kind of information provided by these sources
is important if the two goals facilitated by the speech and debate
clause are to be adequately served. For Congress to perform its
tasks properly, it must have access to all empirical data necessary
to chart the wisest legislative courses. 62 As a unanimous Supreme
56. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 615; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at
679-80.
57. See Comment, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149.
58. See Yankwich, supra note 3, at 976-77.
59. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, supra note 3, at 198 n.46.
60. 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part). See also 408 U.S. at 663 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149.
61. In Branzburg the Court noted: "Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define
those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege . . . • The informative
function asserted by representatives of the organized press ... is also performed by
lectures, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists." 408 U.S.
at 704-05. See Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 125, supra note 3, at 149.
62. Because of the widespread practice of classifying information in the executive
brancl1, sec Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. ll30, 1200-02 (1972) (hereinafter Developments-National
Security], disclosure of most of the information that Congressmen are likely to desire
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Court recognized in McGrain v. Daughtery: 63 "A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information-which is not infrequently true-recourse
must be had to others who do possess it." 64 The legislature also has
the important role, as the watchdog of the executive branch, of ensuring that legislative directives are carried out. 60 As ·woodrow Wilson said: "[q]uite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of
administration.'' 66
Furthermore, outside information may play an important role
in maintaining the balance of power between the branches of government. 67 The executive, as the operational branch of government, has
primary knowledge of its own policies and of the manner in which
they are being implemented; the legislature, which must oversee
and evaluate, has the burden of uncovering the information that the
executive does not voluntarily disclose. 68 This is of considerable significance given the tendency of the executive to supply voluntarily
only information that reflects favorably on its proposals or operations, 69 and given the recent transfer of many operational functions
from the Congress to the executive.70 The resultant legislative powerlessness will also harm Congress' relative influence with the citizenry;
in President Truman's words, "an uninformed Congress surely will
forfeit a large portion of the respect and confidence of the people." 71
If this information is necessary to serve the purposes of the
and would be unable personally to obtain is likely to be a criminal act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1970).
63. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
64. 273 U.S. at 174-75.
65. See generally, W. KEEFE &: M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 16-19
(2d ed. 1968); S. BAILEY, THE NEW CONGRESS 86-88 (1966).
66. W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 297.
67. See note 33 supra. Even if this information only aids Congress in enacting legislation, it can play an important role in maintaining a balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branches. See J. ROBINSON, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICYMAKING 173 (rev. ed. 1967): "Essential to the larger objective of the check-and-balance
mechanism is the operation of Congress as a constructive or positive instrument of
national policy. Congress can, of course, check the executive and judiciary by negative
acts-that is, by mere amending or legitimating decisions. However, we expect Congress also to balance the other two branches by proposing its original, creative solutions to both old and new problems" (emphasis original).
68. See Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1210. Because the
executive branch presently has a greater ability to bring information together, it will
inevitably be the primary congressional source of information. J. ROBINSON, supra
note 67, at 178-79.
69. See Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1210.
70. See E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 2 (2d rev. ed. 1956).
71. Hearings Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 18 Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 908 n.3 (1945).
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clause, it must next be asked whether immunity for sources is needed
to gather information. Arguably, information derived from inside
sources is of relatively little importance. Although no empirical data
are available, even if the legislative immunity applied, inside sources
might be unlikely to supply important data to legislators because of
other available outlets. Newsmen, for example, are initially more
accessible than legislators and are more interested in inside crime
stories that appeal to reader interest. More important, newsmen
have a greater opportunity to cultivate networks of sources because
of their nonofficial status.
However, in an important group of recent incidents involving
the transmittal of information from within the executive, inside
sources have provided considerable information to legislators. There
have been many instances in which legislators have received tips
from lower or middle level executive officials who might have otherwise been deterred by the threat of a grand jury investigation.72 The
information disclosed has been qualitatively, if not quantitatively,
significant, for it has aided the Congress in playing its watchdog role
and has helped to redress the imbalance of power caused by congressional ignorance about the workings of the rest of the government. Although never empirically proved, it seems that an inside
informant would be more likely to divulge information if his anonymity could be unqualifiedly guaranteed.73
It may also be argued that immunity from questioning about
sources is not essential because Congress has alternative mechanisms
for acquiring information. Its most potent means of acquiring information is the legislative investigation.74 Additionally, through its
various powers-over appropriations and over the ratification of
treaties, for example-Congress can coerce those who have necessary
information.75 Finally, if necessary, Congress could completely eliminate the criminal laws against the release or receipt of the kind of
data that it needs to perform its legislative functions properly. 76 If
72. The leak of the Pentagon Papers is itself one example. Another occurred when
Ernest Fitzgerald informed Congress of the cost overruns on the C-5A cargo plane.
See Landauer, Pity Him Who Tells of Cost Overruns, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1970, at 22,
cols. 4-6.
73. See 408 U.S. at 630 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
74. See genernlly Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory
Power, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 3 (1959).
75. See Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 486 (1956): "Congressional control over appropriations and
legislation is an excellent guarantee that the executive will not lightly reject a Congressional request for information, for it is well aware that such a rejection increases
the chances of getting either no legislation or undesired legislation."
76. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 199. See also United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972): "If we underestimate the potential for harassment,
the Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Members from the ambit of the federal
bribery laws . . . ."
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these threats are effective, the importance of encouraging inside informers is considerably lessened.
_
Upon examination of these alternative means of obtaining infor.. mation, however, it becomes clear that informers may still play a
strong role in ensuring that all important data is available to congressmen. Unless Congress is apprised of certain developments by
inside sources, it will not know what questions to ask in investigations or whether the answers it receives are correct and complete. 77
For the same reason, dependence upon those whom it is questioning
also hinders Congress' ability to obtain information through the
coercive use of its powers over appropriations and treaties. Additionally, the effectiveness in uncovering information of even a focused
investigation can be considerably diminished by the exercise of
executive or fifth amendment privileges.78 Moreover, those who
break the old laws are often best qualified to provide information
about the ineffectiveness of those laws and the need for reform. A
good example is the Pentagon Papers incident itself.79
Changing the disclosure laws themselves is not a satisfactory
alternative, for an effective change would depend upon the cooperation of the majority of the legislators, while the clause, which
protects legislators as individuals, guarantees members with a minority viewpoint access to information so that they too can intelligently
advocate their views. Their access to sources should be constitutionally, not legislatively, protected.
The third ques1:ion deals with whether countervailing considerations militate against an immunity for questioning about sources.
Both the orderly and efficient administration of justice and the interests protected by the laws violated by the third party would be
served by the testimony of the legislator. Since early in the development of English law it has been recognized that the basic interest
promoted by the duty to testify at judicial proceedings is the full
ascertainment of facts. 80 In the Gravel context, disclosure of all the
facts is important to aid a grand jury to fulfill its dual role of investigating crimes and protecting the accused until the charges are
77. As Senator J. W. Fulbright said in response to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos'
failure to mention large-scale bombing missions in Laos: "We do not know enough to
ask you these questions unless you are willing to volunteer the information. There is
no way for us to ask you questions about things we don't know you are doing."
SENATE Co111111. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 92D CONG., lsr SESS., SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AS
A PROBLEM: IN THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 30 (Comm. Print 1970).
78. See generally Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L.
REv. 1044, 1287-333 (1965). See also Ervin, supra note 3, at 191-93.
79. See Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-The

Pentagon Papers Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter Information Policies Hearings].
80. See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confi•
dential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 319 (1970).
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found to be credible. 81 Because of the existence of other testimony,
that of legislators will rarely be determinative in either grand jury
proceedings or in civil and criminal trials. But the invocation of the
speech or debate immunity for questioning about sources will always
result in some damage to the interest in full disclosure.
Moreover, the interests represented by the specific laws in question will always be sacrificed somewhat by extending the immunity.
Although the laws involved may be meant to protect interests in life
and property, in a case where legislative immunity is invoked the
interests will most often be, like those in Gravel, designed to protect what one ·writer has called the executive's right of privacy.82
Despite all that has been said recently about the "people's right to
know," it is almost universally conceded that the executive may have
a legitimate need for secrecy83 with regard to some of its various
functions, such as military responsibilities in both war and peace,84
orderly diplomacy,85 the promotion of close and efficient working
relationships among government personnel,86 and the maintenance of the confidentiality of governmental files on individuals.87
This need for secrecy is explicitly recognized in the Constitution,88
and since the founding of the Republic presidents have successfully
asserted their right to some executive nondisclosure.89 A variety of
both statutory and informal means have been used to ensure secrecy:
the hiring of trustworthy personnel, the use of codes and classifica81. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
82. See generally Bishop, supra note 75.
83. See generally Henkin, The Right To Know and the Duty To Withhold: The
Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 271 (1971).
84. Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1190-91. This secrecy is
particularly necessary in the nuclear age because strategic advantages are often the
result of technological information. Id.
85. Bishop, supra note 75, at 478: "[T]he files of the State and Defense Departments are •.• full of records of conversations between the governments of the United
States and other countries, the disclosure of which might benefit the political fortunes
of the Congressmen who disclosed them in approximate proportion to its adverse
effect on relations between the two countries.'' See also Secretary Rogers' News Conference of July 1: The Duty of the Executive Branch To Protect the National Security,
65 DEPT. STATE BULL. 78, 79-80 (1971).
86. See Bishop, supra note 75, at 487-88; Developments-National Security, supra
note 62, at 1192.
87. See Bishop, supra note 75, at 487. Such files often contain derogatory and untrue
information. Id.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5: "Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment
require secrecy • • . .''
The power to conduct foreign relations was given to the executive rather than to
Congress, and a part in making treaties was given to the less numerous Senate rather
than to the House, in part because of a need for secrecy. Henkin, supra note 83, at
273-74.
89. See generally Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period
1953-1960, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (1961).
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tion systems, and the enactment of laws to protect secret information. 90 Thus, there is a recognized interest in preventing the release
of information presently concealed by the executive branch, an interest that would be sacrificed to some extent by any impediment to the
enforcement of security laws.
But when the recipient of information is a legislator, this countervailing consideration should not be determinative. It can fairly be
assumed that there are few national enemies among congressmen.91
Past experience suggests that Congressmen will seldom publicly reveal highly sensitive information in a way that would compromise
any national interest.92 Furthermore, it is arguable that informants
should be encouraged to give their information to legislators, rather
than to newspapermen or others likely to disseminate it widely. 03
Finally, legislators need information about the enforcement of enacted laws to see whether these laws are serving their intended
purposes. To the extent that the laws represent the public will, they
only do so if they are operating in the way that the legislature expected them to operate.
. It may be suggested that in each fact situation the judiciary
should consider these competing interests before deciding whether
to apply the immunity.94 The courts could simply balance the interests in each case, as suggested by Justice Stewart in Gravel. 95 Or,
as advocated by Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg,96 the Court
could in each instance require the prosecution to prove both that its
interest in having the legislator testify about his sources is a compelling one and that there are no alternative ways to acquire the information.
The two basic reasons given by the Court in Branzburg for rejecting these approaches also apply to Gravel. First, both methods
would do little to encourage sources to divulge information to
legislators, for an informant would never be certain that his anonym90. Henkin, supra note 83, at 275. For a description of the system used to classify
secret information, see Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1198-205.
91. See Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, supra note 3, at 198 n.46.
92. See Information Policies Hearings, supra note 79, at 922 (statement of William
Macomber).
Besides Gravel's disclosure of the Pentagon Papers, the most serious case of con•
gressional disclosure was Senator Burton K. Wheeler's revelation in 1941, while the
operation was still in progress, that the Navy was occupying Iceland. See Bishop, supra
note 75, at 486 n.41.
The House of Representatives apparently has no rules that govern the handling
of classified information, but the Senate rules allow expulsion of a Senator who reveals such information. Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1209.
93. See Note, The Right of Government Employees To Furnish Information to
Congress: Statutory and Constitutional Aspects, 57 VA. L. REv. 885, 906 (1971).
94. See generally Note, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 198-201.
95. 408 U.S. at 632.
96. 408 U.S. at 739-40.
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ity would be preserved.97 As the Court in Branzburg noted: "If newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be,
the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the
situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem." 98
Second, the judicial balancing approach raises problems concerning the competence of courts to decide these cases.99 Because the
facts and interests involved may be varied, and;J:he number of cases
decided under the clause is so limited, framing an adequate and
comprehensive standard of decision might be difficult.100 Moreover,
when classified information is at issue a court may not be able to
balance the interests adequately because of the unavailability of
necessary data. 101 Finally, in balancing the interests involved, courts
would be required to decide whether or not to enforce different laws.
As the Court in Branzburg said: "[Courts] would be making a value
judgment that a legislature had declined to make ...." 102
Because of the difficulties inherent in a case-by-case approach, the
only alternative to shutting off a qualitatively important source of
information103 is an absolute immunity from questioning about
sources, at least where the legislator is not himself involved in any
criminal activity other than the receipt of the information. This
approach is doctrinally justified to prevent the "indirect impairment"104 of those activities at the core of the speech or debate clause
-voting and speech-making. The immunity should here be ex97. 408 U.S. at 702. See also Note, supra note 80, at 340-41.
98. 408 U.S. at 702.
99. 408 U.S. at 705-06. See also Henkin, supra note 83, at 278-79.
100. This problem was described in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207 (1962) as "a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" a controversy.
But see Scharpf, supra note 34, at 555-58.
IOI. See generally Scharpf, supra note 34, at 567-73. See also Henkin, supra note
83, at 279. But see Developments-National Security, supra note 62, at 1225-26. In
recognition of these problems, courts have left the decision of when information
should be classified to the executive. See, e.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). See generally Developments-National Security, supra,
at 1221-27.
102. 408 U.S. at 706.
103. One other possible approach is embodied in S. 2965, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971). This bill would create an expert bipartisan disclosure board that would subpoena upon request documents that an executive agency has refused to supply. The
board would balance the interests at stake to determine whether and to what extent the documents should be released. The President would have the power to overrule the board, but his decision would be appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. This proposal was discussed in Note, 86 HARv.
L. REv. I, supra note 3, at 199-200. The proposal would not adequately solve the problem of congressional unawareness of many documents. See id. at 199 n.5. Also, it gives
no recourse to the legislator whose perception of the public interest is out of step with
t11at of the board. Finally, t11e process could be somewhat slow and cumbersome.
104. "Indirect impairment" of congressional deliberations was the standard used by
t11e court of appeals to determine the scope of the speecl1 or debate clause. United
States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972).
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tended beyond the literal meaning of the words of the clause for the
same reasons that the Court in Gravel extended it to cover legislative
aides: "[T]he Court's consistent approach has been that to confine
the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in
debate would be an unacceptably narrow view . . . . Rather than
giving the Clause a cramped construction, the Court has sought to
implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from
executive and judicial oversight that realistically threaten to control
his conduct as a legislator. 105 This position is also supported by the
relative importance of the competing interests in the contemporary
world. As Professor Bernard Schwartz has noted: "The overriding
peril of the present century [is] the superstate with its omnipotent
administration, unrestrained by any checks on its all pervasive regulatory activities .... If the elected representatives assert the right to
lay bare all that goes on within the executive, that danger may be
avoided." 106
The scope of this legislative immunity should not be exaggerated.
In spite of the importance of a legislative need for information, the
line between protected and unprotected information gathering
should be drawn to protect only those instances where the legislator
is implicated merely in the receipt of information and not in any
other alleged crime. Criminal conduct such as fraud or breaking
and entering should not be protected even though the information
gained may be relevant to legislative activities. 107 A wider immunity
would totally sacrifice the ultimate interests protected by the specific
statutes under investigation-privacy, security of person and property, and secrecy. Under an immunity limited to sources, however,
these interests can still be protected to some extent, for the informant
would still be liable for the original criminal conduct, and the limitations on the immunity would deter the congressman's participation
in the original criminal act. Additionally, Congress' interest in acquiring information would be adequately secured by encouraging
sources to divulge information through a source immunity, without
the excessive costs inherent in an immunity for all criminal information gathering acts.

III. SHOULD PRIVATE REPUBLICATION BE IMMUNE?
The Court's refusal to grant immunity to the efforts of Senator
Gravel and his aide to have the Papers privately republished pre105. 408 U.S. at 617-18.
106. Hearings on Availability of Information from Federal Departments and
Agencies Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (1956).
107. Similarly, the immunity should not be e.xtended to include information
gathering conduct violating an individual's constitutional right. A court should be
allowed to balance the interests involved in such cases, as it has traditionally done.
Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See generally Note, 86 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1, supra note 3, at 200 n.58.
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sents problems similar to those discussed above. Again, the basic
inquiry is whether activity that normally takes place outside Congress should be immune. Although many of the same interests are at
stake, there is one important difference between this case and the
question of immunity from questioning about sources: At the time
of republication, clearly protected conduct, voting and speechmaking, has already taken place. Immunity for republication, then,
unlike that for questioning about sources, does not clearly facilitate
these purely legislative acts. 108
The first question is whether republication should be considered
a protected "legislative act" because it aids in the performance of
the "informing function" of Congress. The informing function encompasses four very important interests. The first is the interest in
an educated and informed citizenry.109 Information may be of public
concern because it relates to bills pending before Congress or because
it acquaints the public with the purposes and ideas of its elected
representatives. 110 The legislature gathers and presents such information about other branches of the government in its role as "watchdog."111 Although information conveyed by the legislature in performing this function may be to some extent protected by the first
amendment,11 2 because Congress plays a particularly important role
in guiding, shaping, and informing public opinion113 society has a
special interest in giving a protection to legislators beyond that
accorded by the first amendment.
A second interest to be promoted is the assurance that the legislature will remain an independent center of power. The chief executive and his subordinates presently wield enormous influence in
shaping public opinion on current issues and in encouraging public
acquiescence in executive action. It should be noted that executive
department heads and lower officials are protected by a judicially
created immunity in many of their public communications.114 Be108. 408 U.S. at 625-26.
109. This aspect of the informing function is discussed at length by Justice Brennan. See 408 U.S. at 649-56.
llO. W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 303.
lll. See generally R. L'I.HR 8: J. THEIS, CONGRESS: POWER AND PURPOSE ON CAPITOL
HILL 105-07 (1967); E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CoNTEMl'ORARY ROLE 109-23 (3d ed.
1961).
II2. See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-ll (Vintage ed. 1967).
ll3. Led and checked by Congress, the prurient and fearless, because anonymous,
animadversions of the Press, now so often premature and inconsiderate, might be
disciplined into serviceable capacity to interpret and judge. Its energy and
sagacity might be tempered by discretion, and strengthened by knowledge. One
of our chief constitutional difficulties is that, in opportunities for informing and
guiding public opinion, the freedom of the Press is greater than the freedom of
Congress.
W. WILSON, supra note 25, at 305-06.
ll4. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483
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cause of present executive strength, the legislature must also be able
to convey its viewpoint in order to build public support for its
positions. The release of the Pentagon Papers is instructive in this
regard; if the legislature had had access to and been able to disseminate earlier the contents of the Papers, the American involvement in
Viet Nam brought about by the executive might have been contained.
The third interest involved in the informing function is described by Justice Brennan as the instillation in the people of confidence in their govemment.115 This sense of security comes in part
from the people's awareness of the activities and intentions of their
representatives. To some extent it also comes from the people's
knowledge that they are not totally powerless to affect either the
legislators themselves or, through their legislators, the executive. In
general, the dissemination of information by legislators, like all free
expression, encourages the stability and consensus necessary for any
political democracy.
Fourth, there is a special interest to be served in allowing individual legislators like Gravel to reach a wider audience despite the
opposition of most or all of their fellow legislators. Underlying both
the first amendment and the informing function is the notion that in
a democracy even the lone dissenter's voice is a vital part of any
public debate.116 To this end the immunity is conferred by the
clause on individual legislators; 117 even a maverick senator represents his constituents. It should also be noted that executive encroachment on Congress is likely to be most often directed at individuals, since it is more difficult and politically risky to attempt to
intimidate a numerically large proportion of the legislature.118
The legitimacy of the informing function is recognized in several
legal mechanisms. In Gravel Justice Brennan pointed to the franking
privilege, telephone and telegraph allowances, stationary allotments,
and favorable prices on reprints from the Congressional Record as
examples of instances where Congress has undertaken to perform
(1896). See generally Handler &: Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits
Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. R.Ev. 44 (1969).
115. 408 U.S. at 651-52.
116. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 112, at 4-7.
117. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 548-49 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
quoting Coffin v. Massachusetts, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1804):
[I]t appears •.. that the privilege secured by [the clause] is not so much the
privilege of the house as an organized body, as of each individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even against the declared will of the
house. For he does not hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house; but
derives it from the will of the people, expressed in the constitution, which is paramount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature.
(emphasis added by Justice Brennan).
118. See the discussion of congressional weapons that can be used against the
executive in text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
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this function. 119 The most prominent recognition of the function is
the journal of proceedings clause of the Constitution.120
Congress' ability to inform would be promoted if private republication were immunized. As Justice Brennan suggested,121 a "wider"
audience is reached through republication by private means than by
the Congressional Record, which very few citizens read regularly, or
the newspapers, which cannot be depended upon to reprint in their
entirety bulky, detailed reports like the Pentagon Papers. 122 But even
where the informing function has been recognized as a valid legislative task, its protection has been limited by competing interests. For
example, in United States v. Rumely,123 Justice Frankfurter stated:
Although the indispensable "informing function of Congress" is not
to be minimized, determination of the "rights" which this function
implies illustrates the common juristic situation thus defined for the
Court by Mr. Justice Holmes: "all rights tend to declare themselves
absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the
neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which become strong
enough to hold their own when a certain point is reached." 124

There are four problems in extending the immunity granted by
the speech or debate clause to republication. First, such an extension
would be a serious break with precedent. While the famous English
case Stockdale v. Hansard, 125 cited by the Gravel majority,126 is not
itself strong authority,12 7 two cases cited in Stockdale unequivocally
hold that republication is not within the scope of the English speech
or debate clause: The King v. Lord Abingdon,128 in which Abingdon
republished at his own expense a House of Lord's speech that
charged a Sherman of Gray's Inn with improper conduct, held that
an action would lie for libel, although the words would not be
punishable by the courts had they merely been delivered in ParliaI 19. 408 U.S. at 650.
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5. See generally Note, 81 YALE L.J. 188, supra note 3, at
202-04.
121. 408 U.S. at 649.
122. In fact, the failure of the press to publish the more complete version of the
Papers that Gravel had read into the subcommittee record was the factor that motivated him to go to private book publishers. See S. UNGAR, supra note 6, at 268.
123. 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (congressional committee had no power under authorizing
resolution to compel disclosure of customers by seller of _"political" books).
124. 345 U.S. at 43-44, quoting Hudson County Water Co. v. Mccarter, 209 U.S.
349, 355 (1908).
125. ll2 Eng. Rep. lll2 (Q.B. 1839).
126. 408 U.S. at 622-24.
127. See 408 U.S. at 658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv
125, supra note 3, at 147.
128. 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (N.P. 1794).
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ment, and The King v. Creevey 129 held that a member of the House
of Commons could be convicted for republishing a libelous speech
made in the House of Commons. Justice Story's view of the scope
of the speech or debate clause was in accord with this English precedent: "[A]lthough a speech delivered in the house of commons is
privileged, and the member cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere, yet, if he publishes his speech, and it contains libelous matter,
he is liable to an action and prosecution therefor as in common cases
of libel. And the same principles seem applicable to the privilege of
debate and speech in Congress." 130
The two lower federal court cases that treated the question of
private republication prior to Gravel followed these English decisions. In Long v. Ansell,131 the court indicated that the immunity
would not be a defense to a claim of libel against a senator who
allowed copies of the Congressional Record containing allegedly
defamatory speech to be circulated in the mails. 132 And in McGovern
v. Martz, 133 it was held with regard to the defendant's counterclaim
for libel that the absolute privilege to inform fellow legislators becomes a qualified privilege for republication by unofficial circulation
of the Congressional Record; 134 the legislator is privileged only if he
does not act maliciously in circulating reprints or copies of the
Record to congressmen.135
These precedents may not be directly relevant to Gravel because
they involve immunity from libel or slander, rather than from
criminal prosecution. It could be argued that an exception should
be made for actions like Gravel's because, unlike the slanderous
expression in Long and McGovern, Gravel's conduct was directly
related to a purpose of the clause-preserving the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.
However, the reason for the limitations on the immunity found
in these precedents is equally applicable to Gravel. As Lord Denman
indicated in Stockdale, that decision was based on the assumption
that republication in general, unlike actual debate, was not intended
to be immune.136 In Long, the immunity was not applied to republication because the "acts charged have only a remote connection
129. 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K.B. 1813).
130. J. STORY, l COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 611 (4th ed. 1873).
131. 69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.), afld., 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
132. 69 F.2d at 389 (dictum).
133. 182 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960).
134. 182 F. Supp. at 347. However, the privilege does extend to material inserted
by a Congressman into the Congressional Record with the consent of the House or
Senate, even if the material is not read on the floor. 182 F. Supp. at 347.
135. 182 F. Supp. at 348.
136. 112 Eng. Rep. at 1172.
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with the speech."137 And in 1'.1.cGovern, it was stated that republication should not be given speech or debate immunity because the
"reason for the rule--complete and uninhibited discussion among
legislators-is not here served." 138 Thus, although the speech-making
and report-·writing clearly protected by the clause do incidentally
inform the public, they are protected because they involve communication with other legislators in the process of legislative deliberation, not because they serve the informing function. This process
is not served by republication outside the legislature, whether the
laws involved protect individual reputations or national security.
In Doe v. McMillan, 139 decided after Gravel, the Supreme Court,
in holding that there is no immunity for the Superintendent of
Documents and the Public Printer when they print a subcommittee
report ordered to be printed by Congress where the report infringes
on important personal rights, found that the performance of the
informing function was not essential to the legislative activity meant
to be protected by the speech or debate clause. 140 Doe demonstrates
a judicial approach to the informing function consistent with that
of the cases discussed above.
The second justification for not extending the immunity to
republication is that speeches outside the Congress, even those that
merely repeat what was said within legislative chambers, are not
afforded protection.141 Both these speeches and republication involve
the communication of views by the legislator outside the halls of
Congress and both similarly promote the informing function.
The third problem with extending the immunity to private
republication is that important competing interests would be sacrificed. One kind of harm done would be to individual privacy and
reputation. 142 More important, an extension of the clause may seriously impair those interests associated with the activities of the
executive branch. 143 The sacrifice of these interests was acceptable
when dealing with an immunity for questioning about sources;
however, the sacrifice may become unacceptable for an action not
closely related to those activities at the core of the clause-voting
and speechmaking within Congress. Although any argument that
the national security was immediately endangered by the disclosure
of the Pentagon Papers is doomed to failure, 144 it is certainly not
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

69 F.2d at 389.
182 F. Supp. at 397 (emphasis original).
41 U.S.L.W. 4752 (U.S., May 29, 1973).
41 U.S.LW. at 4755.
41 U.S.L.W. at 4755.
See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 82-90 supra and accompanying text.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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difficult to imagine a case in which the public release of secret
information by a legislator would irreparably harm the national
interest, especially in time of war. 145 Even though the absence of
legislative immunity does not guarantee that a congressman will not
release such information outside Congress, disclosure is deterred because of the risk of criminal sanctions.
Although these interests may be impaired to some extent by
protected legislative expression within Congress, the potential for
harm would be much greater if the privilege was extended, for republication would lead to wider dissemination. Additionally, the
opportunity for control by the legislature itself is much greater if
the relevant conduct occurs within Congress or at official legislative
functions. To some extent, members prone to misconduct will be
discouraged, when within Congress, by informal social pressures and
by formal rules from straying too far from the norm of responsible
behavior. 146 But legislators would be less amenable to such controls
if activities outside the halls of Congress or its committee rooms
were immunized, for Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and
punish its members for the wide range of activity that they may engage in outside of Congress. 147
The fourth reason for not extending the immunity to republication is that there are other ways in which the dissemination of
information to the public can be accomplished. Even if Senator
Gravel could not get the newspapers to report fully his version of the
Pentagon Papers, news about many of the proceedings of Congress
are conveyed to the public through the Congressional Record, the
newspapers, radio, and television. Moreover, republication would be
deterred only in those few cases where there was a threat of criminal
or civil liability.
Furthermore, the refusal to extend the absolute immunity of the
speech or debate clause to republication does not preclude the application of a judicially fashioned immunity in civil cases similar to
that for executive republication.148 The scope of this immunity could
be defined with regard to the competing interests present in different
kinds of cases. Although this approach has not as yet been accepted
by the Supreme Court, it has been recognized in several lower court
cases in which the speech or debate clause has been interpreted. 140
145. See note 92 supra.
146. An even more important source of control comes from the enforcement of
specific rules designed to protect the national security. See, e.g., the congressional rules
against disclosing such information at note 92 supra. One of the historical assump•
tions underlying the immunity for speech or debate in the legislature is that the
Congress itself would retain the right, within limits, to discipline its members. See
generally Cella, supra note 3, at 37-41.
147. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518 (1972).
148. See note 114 supra.
149. See, e.g., McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1960); Methodist
Fedn. for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956).
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Most importantly, as long as the legislators themselves have access
to the information, the values ultimately promoted by the performance of the informing function would not be greatly hindered,
even if specific bits of data could not be conveyed to the public. As
noted above,160 society's interest in legislative access to all of the
facts is stronger than its interest in total access for the people at large
because congressmen are immediately entrusted with the task of lawmaking. Also, if the legislators are fully informed, they can to a
considerable extent instruct public opinion as to the import of
sensitive data even if they are unable to reveal details.
Unfortunately, the interests of dissident legislators will be sacrificed to some extent by not applying the clause to republication. It is
true that such congressmen may be unable to express their views
publicly when the immunity is thus limited: They are subject to the
regular criminal and civil laws for communication outside Congress,
and their opportunity to disseminate some kinds of information
within the legislature itself could be constricted by the rules imposed
by the majority. But the public expressions of minority legislators
will not be totally cut off. To begin with, the criminal or civil laws
and the rules of the legislature will deter them in only the few
cases where the laws apply. Furthermore, they may still persuade the
majority of legislators to change the rules to allow them to present
the data within the Congress without penalty. And, even if the laws
are not changed, under the first amendment doctrine of prior restraint101 they will almost always be able to reveal their information
publicly if they are willing to risk subsequent conviction. Nonetheless, this cost of limiting the immunity is considerable.
However, in sum, the majority's refusal to apply the immunity to
private republication is a justifiable accommodation of strong competing interests in accordance with the historic interpretation of the
scope of the speech or debate clause.
Even though both involve some act1v1ty outside the halls of
Congress, there are several reasons for preferring immunity for
questioning about sources over immunity for republication. First,
the interest in access to information is greater for legislators than for
average citizens. Second, many of the basic values promoted by republication can be served to some extent without immunity as long
as the legislature has the information in the first place. Third, the
150. See text accompanying notes 91-93 supra.
151. Although the boundaries of the doctrine of prior restraint are not com-

pletely clear, at a minimum "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression ..• [bears]
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). For a recent application of the doctrine, see New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 503-12 (1970); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP.
PROB.

6·18 (1955).
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acquisition of relevant data is more directly related to the performance of the law-making activity at the core of the speech or debate
immunity than is republication. Fourth, the speech or debate clause
has historically been interpreted to include immunity for sources
and not republication. It should also be noted that the argument
favoring immunity for questioning about sources is stronger if there
is no immunity for republication, for the data acquired from sources
is not as likely to be harmfully disseminated. For these reasons, the
Court's interpretation of the immunity with respect to republication
appears to be acceptable, but its failure to find an immunity for
questioning about sources appears to be historically and practically
unacceptable.

